292

International Law Studies - Volume 62
The Use of Force, Human Rights, and General International Legal Issues
Richard B. Lillich & John Norton Moore (editors)

PRISONER AND WAR NEGOTIATIONS:
THE KOREAN EXPERIENCE AND LESSON
Harry P. Ball
INTRODUCTION
.From April through September of
1953, over 3,700 Americans were released to U.S. control from the prisoner-of-war camps in North Korea.
Today several hundred Americans are
estimated to he held prisoner in North
Vietnam and in the jungle strongholds
of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam.
As will be demonstrated, the fate of
these prisoners will depend, as did
the fate of those in Korea, on the outcome of negotiations.
The United States lIJust be prepan-d
fllr thl's(' nl'~otiations. It ~hould Ilot
again allow talks to dra~ on for 2
years, serving COlllmunist purpos('~,

\\ hile ca~lIalti('s arc hein~ suffered on
the halllcfield, and mcn c()ntinu(! to
languish in prisoner-of-war camps. We
must learn from the experience of
Korea. lL is hoped that this papcr will
contribute to that learning. Its purpose is simply to draw upon our experience in both negotiating for the
repatriation of prisoners of war ancl
in administering prisoners of war in
Korea. Lessons wiII be sought that
have application to negotiations over
prisoners of war in Vietnam.
To ~atisf)' this purpose requires,
first. a hrit'f (,oll1pari~nJl of the pnlitical
arlll military situatioJl ill 1\.111"(-:\ ill
1951-5:~ with that in Vietnam ill )%B
ill order to appreciate the similarities

The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.
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and dilTen'nces of Ihe Iwo l'ellin~s.
Our purpose Ihen ill\·olves the accomplishment of Ihree lasks. The first is
to make a detailed study of Ihe Korean
prisoner-of-war negotiations with Ihe
object of isolating mistakes that were
made and delermining whether the
agreement finally reached will have an
impact on Vietnam negotiations. The
second is an examination of the current prisoner-oC-war situation on bOlh
sides in Vietnam and its possible influence on negotiations. The third and
final task is to recommend procedures
and courses of action that, if astutely
implemented, will assist our negotiators in insuring the early ~epatriation
of American prisoners of war.

I-

KOREA AND VIETNAM:
A COMPARISON

Thc RC(IUiremcnt for Ncgotiations in Vietnam. On 27 July 1953
the commander of the United Nations
Command in Korea, l the commander
of tl\(' [Norlh] Korean People's Army,
and Ihe commander of the Chinese
People's Volunteer Army signed Ihe
mililary armistice bringing a cease-fire
to Ihe Korean war. This cloGumcnt
was Ihe rl'5ull of 2 p'ars of n("~olia
tions between representatives of the
commanders on each side. It ended
the first conflict since 1812 in which
the mililary situation did not allow
the United States either to force concessions or dictate terms. The last 1·1months of the negotiations were ("011cm·ned wilh the only unresolved issue
between the two parties: the repatriation of prisoners of war.
At this writing, just short of 15
years after the signing of the Korean
armislice, U.S. forces are again locked
in comhal wilh a c'olllnlllllist 1'1\(,1ll)"
on an Asian peninsula. On(·e a~aill
the misforlunes of war have resuilrc!
in Ihe caplure anc! confinelllent in Com-

nlllnil't prisons (If j\ lIwriean soldi('rs,
sailors, and airmen. As in Korea, the
Unilcd Stales has chosen to limit its
application of military power. F urther, it proposes to bring an end to
the fighting. through negotiations.
There is no assurance that negotiations will be the method through which
the fighting in Vietnam is brought to
a close. Combat could quite logically
gradually decrease in intensity, as did
the guerrilla war in Greece in 19-1-8,
until the war is simply no longer being
fought.:! But Ihe United States has a
solemn obligation to its captured personnel. Their repatriation can only
be accomplished through negotiation
with those that hold them. The alternative to negotiating their release is
to abandon them.
It does not follow, of course, that
these negotiations will necessarily be
of the same format and protocol as
those in Korea. Possible forms of these
negotiations range from a full-blown
international conference, where the exchange of prisoners of war is but one
agenda ilem, to quiet dialog in a
neulral country, or mere clandestine
meetings in a jungle clearing. They
could also be conducted by third parlies rcprescnlinp; onc or bOlh sides.
Bill IdJaI("vI~r form III(' 1II·~oliali()IIS
lake, they wiH be a reflcction of,the political and military situation in Vietnam
at the time. Accordingly, the application of the Korean negotiating experience to Vietnam depends upon the comparability of the two settings.
Similarities. Both conflicts
stemmed from a confrontation between
Communist expansion into the periphery of Asia and the U.S. determination
to contain that expansion. Both reyolve around a single nalion which
jwcall\(' Iwo slales dil'idl,t! hy a lilH',
lIlt' :lBlh paralld ill Kon'a, Ilw 171h ill
Vielnam, which oslensibly was 10 haye
been temporary. In e;ch case Ihe
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ComllluJlist-<:oJltrollcd Jlorth_ honh'riJl~
on Communist China, attempted to
seize the southern portion through the
use of force. In Korea the seizure was
attempted through invasion hy conventional forces supported to a degree hy a guerrilla force, in Vietnam
through armed insurgency and guerrilla warfare supported to a degree by
com'entional military formations infiltrated into the south. Communist objectives were identical in hoth instances: to unify the nation hy force
under a Communist regime.
In each case the U.S.-supported
forces in the south pro\-ed to be inadequate to the task of defense. American armed forces were intr<~d.!lced at
the last moment, just in time to save
Pusan in 1950, just in time to save
Saigon in 1965. The American military commitment took similar forms;
piecemeal introduction of ground
forces to secure critical areas in the
south, coupled with an air campai~n
against the 'north, with all military
action heing limited to the geographical
area of the contested nation. Limited
as the commitment was in each case,
military initiative ultimately passed to
the U.S. forces. Intervention occurred
at just that time when the Communists
must IUH'e begun to think of yie!ory
parades.
The Communist reaction to American intervention was similar in both
events. To salvage the situation in
Korea, major formations of the Chinese
Communist Army were committed. In
an attempt to regain the initiative in
Vietnam, major formations of the
North Vietnamese Army entered the
struggle. Communist military successes, at first relatively cheap, had
been made extremely expensive. Prospeets of a('hie\'ing their ohjeetin'
throu~h military action dimllled. Vi,·tl)ry. OIH"l' appearing hut Illonths pr
weeks away, receded into the future,
if possible at all.

While stall'nlatl' does not ,w('uralt,l)
describe either the situation in Korea
at the time armistice negotiatioJls he·
gan or the situation in Vietnam toda) ,
the two situations can be depicted as
ones in which victory in a military
sense cannot be quickly achieved by
either side with the force levels deployed. In Korea a realistic estimate
of the military situation led the Communists to propose truce talks - a proposal accepted eagerly by the United
States. In Vietnam the Communist
estimate has not yet led them to a
similar conclusion.
In the meantime, hattles in Vietnam
have resulted in over 6,000 Communists being interned in prisoner-of-war
camps in the south:! as were 169,000
Comll1unists at the time of the Korean
negotiations. 4 As of August 1967 there
were approximately 650 American
military personnel who were classified
as either missing or as prisoners of
war in North'and South Vietnam. The
Unitefl States believed that :;ome 200
of these men were being held as prisoners of war. Also held as prisoners
of war were an unknown number of
_soldiers of the Army of the Republic
of Vietnam (ARVN).r. This compares
to ;~,746 American, 8,:'.21 personn('1 of
the Ht'Jluhlic of Korl'a Anlly (HOKA).
and 1,377 personnel from other national contingents of the United Nations
Commallfl who were held in North
Korea.r. While the weight of prisoners
on both sides is smaller, a larger number is again held hy the side allied with
the United Slates.
The U.S. Government cannot turn
its hack on the Americans in enemy
hands. It is ohlil!ated by the fundamental heliefs underlying the American
political system to do all it can to
obtain th(, release of its citizt'n!'. Till'
Coil" of Contluct pronllllgall'tl in I (I;';'
for Ihl' guitlance of U.S. l;l'r\"i('('1l1l'1l
made e\-cn more explicit this ohli~atioJ\
of the U.S. Go\'ernment.;
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The code formally illlpO~CS ohli~a
tions on the individual members of the
Armed Forces of the United States,
but it is the last sentence of the last
article which is pertinent to this paper_.
It reads, "I will trust in my God and
the United States of America." The
Department of Defense has stated in
its training instructions,
Ju~t as you ha\"l' a Tc!'pon!'ihility 10
your country under the Code of Conduct, the Unitl'd Slatcs Govcrnnwnl hag
a matchin~ rr!'pou~ihilily - alway~ In
!'Iand hrhind c\'cry Amcrican fi~hlin~
man. An individual unfol'luna\(' ('Il<lll/!h
to become a prisoner of war will not
be forgollcn by his Govcrnmcnt , , _
his Government will use every practical
means to establish conlact wilh and
support our prisoners of war, and In
gain their release,"

American negotiators in Vietnam,
therefore, will1e subject to limitations
and pressures, as were their predecessors in Korea, that Communist negotiators do noL experience.
Diffcl·eIlCCS. While the situations
in Vietnam and in Korea hm'e ~triking
similarities, they are not carbon copies.
In 1951-53 the Communist forces could
be treated as the instrument of a monolithic hloe led by Moscow. In Vietnam
in 1968 this situation no longer holds.
The Sino-Soviet split places ~Hanoi in
a middle position between the two
Communist giants - a position which
provides some freedom of maneuver
and independence but which is nevertheless precarious. In order to retain
the support of hoth, Hanoi must somehow reconcile the divergent desires of
each. The statements of Kosygin and
Chou in 1968 do not carry the same
authoriLY regarding the VieLnam war
as did the statement~ of Stalin and
Chou of 10;'2 rt'~arding thc Kon'an
war. It wOIlI,1 IH' 1II1\"1'ali~ti,' toda\' til
rely upon thl' COlllllluni~t:; llIakin~ ;'onc('ssions in Asia in unlt'r to inll!II'Ill'I'

c\'ents in Europe or e1~ewhcre on the
international scene. JLwould be equally
unrealistic to ~ely on American adions
outside of Asia innuencing events in
Vietnam. The leverage of hoth the
United States and the U.S.S.R. is therefore considerably reduced in Vietnam
as compared to Korea.
As in Korea, the Communists in
Vietnam find it advantageous to camounage the identity of their participants in the fighting. In the Korean
ca~e the Comlllunists profcsscd that
North Korea was their only bclligercnt,
maintaining the fietion that the "Chinese People's Volunteer Army" was
only assisting it. In Vietnam the. camounage is even denser, the Communists
insisting that the only belligerent is
the so-called National Liberation Front
in South Vietnam. The Hanoi Government doesn't admit that regular units
of the North Vietnamese Army participate in the fighting in South Vietnam.
NegotiaLions for a military cease-fire
in Korea were conducted with Lwo representatives, one from the North Korean
Army. one from the Chinese Army. In
Vietnam, a::::::ullling that the North Vietnamese continue to maintain the fiction of their nonparticipation, they
may insist that llI!~ot iations conc:erning
a c:ease-firl' ill SOllth Vietnam II(' COIlducted with representatives of the National Liberation Front even though
it is North Vietnam that holds the majority of American prisoners.
On the U.S. and allied side, the
command relationships between U.S.
forces and indigenous forces are not
the same as they were in Korea. In
Korea all forces. including those of
South Korea, were under the operational control of the United Nations
Command; in Vietnam such an arran~ellll'IIL doC's not exisl. Gen. William
\V,'stlllll rl'la 1111. th,'
COlllma IIdl'!'
ill Vil'lllam. del(':; not ,')(('r('i:;(' ('0111mand oyer the Hl'pllhlie of Vil,tnalll
Arml'd For('e:; (RVNAF), 1101', inlleell,

r..

n.s.
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thm<e U.S. forcrs lH'ill~ employed ill
the air campaign against North Vietnam.!) Suhordinate U.S. commanders
do not command Vietnamese Army
(ARVN) units as did the Eighth U.S.
Army Commander over South Korean
upits. Lacking a single military command, it is unlikely that one senior
delegate to an armistice conference
could he empowered to represent all
anti·Communist forces as did Adm. C.
Turner Joy and later Gen. William K.
Harrison in Korea.

Summary. In our comparison of
Vietnam with Korea, we have detcrmined that in each case the Communist
ohjective has heen the same: to unify
by force a divided nation into a Communist· state .. \Ve have seen that the
intervention of U.S. armed force in
each case frustrated the Communist
purpose and .that"' a military situation
resulted in which neither side was able
(or willing) to achie\'e military superiority that would allow dictatill~
the terms of an armistice. Prisoners
of war haye been generated hy the
fighting, the large majority again being
held by the anti-Communist forces. In
Korea the military situation led to
truce talks during which the repatriation of prisoners of war was negot iatrd.
In Vietnam the military situation has
not. yet led to truce talks, and there is
no assurance that it will. The repatria·
tion of prisoners of war must, neverthe·
less, be negotiated if the United States
is to meet its commitment to its personnel as expressed in the Code of
Conduct. Because of the fiction of nonparticipation hy North Vietnam in the
southern battles, it appears at this time
that separate negotiations may well
haye to be held with the Hanoi regime
and with the National Liheration Front.
Difiiculties coultl also Ilt' cncounterrll
on til!' l:nilt'd Statl's-Hl'!lublil' of Yit'!·
nam sidl' dul' to tl1l' lack of a sin1!lt'
unified command. With these similari-

tit's alld differences Il('t wcell tIll' tWIl
situations in mind, \1 c will turn to our
study of the Korean negotiations.

II -

KOREA: TIlE INITIAL
NEGOTIATIONS

The Korean armistice was signed 3
years and 1 month after the outbreak
of hostilities; but during 2 of those 3
years negotiations with the enemy
were being conducted to terminate the
lighting. The most difficult issue to
resolve stemmed from fundamental disagreement on whether a prisoner of
war had a choice to be repatriated. The
United Nations Command (UNC) maintained that he did have a choice, and
it would return no prisoner of war who
indicated he would resist repatriation.
The Communist side held that all prisoners of war must be repatriated regardless of their desires. The UNC
stayed with its position until the end.
The Communists eventually made the
necessary concessions that allowed the
armistice to be concluded.
To facilitate discussion, the 2-year
negotiations will be separated into /lYe
phases as they pertained to the prisoner of war issue:
Phase I (July-December 1951): The
Prisoncrs of war
included as an agenda item, but no
negotiations on the issue are conducted.
Phase II (Decem»er 1951-April
1952'): Initial negotiations. Opposing
positions are reached on repatriation.
Agreement to poll prisoners on their
desire.
Phase III (April 1952-0ctober
1952): Deadlock. Results on poll are
announced. Repatriation becomes sole
unresolved issue. Attempts at compro·
mi~c fail.
Phal'r IV ! Ol'loll('1' 1%2-Fl'llI'IJary
prediscm;~ion pha~e.

JI>:l:n:

CI'llt'ral

:\:<sl'lllhl~

dl,hah',;.

Negotiations in rt'l'l':;S. Gl'lwl'al A~·
sembI), passes resolution sponsored br
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India.
Phase V ( February-J uly ] 95:{ ) :
Agreement reached_ Sick and wounded
prisoners exchan~ed. Armistice agreemenL si~ned.
Each of Lhe above phases will be discussed in turn, with emphasis on Lhe
reasoning behind the actions taken by
each side.

Determining the UNC Position.
The UNC position, iniLially termcd
"voluntary repatrialion," was in full
accord with Western liheral Lenets holding that each man has a voice in his
own destin)". It was not a position
that was assumed automatically by the
U.S. Go\·ernment. IL was taken somewhaL reluctantly. The initial insLructions to Gcneral Ridgeway on the prisoner-of-war question were' in the
contexL of confining the negotiati0l1s
solely to military matters. The armistice was to insure that the Communists
did not profit militarily hy a cease-fire.
The UNC negotiators were to insist on
no reinforcement of troops except a
one-for-one replacement and prisoners
of war were to be exchanged like\\ ise
on a one-for-one hasis. If agreement
on these points could he obtained, no
manpower increase on one side would
result that was not to he enjoyed by
the other.1
Armistice negotiations hegan on 10
July 1951. Both sides agreed without
dispute to include as Item Four of the
agenda, "Arrangements relating to
prisoners of war." In late August the
JCS informed General Ridgeway that
he could de\'e1op for planning purposes
a negotiating position based on voluntary repatriation.:! At the end of \Yorld
War II U.S. leader~hip had been
shocked at the reaction of former 50"iet and Eastern European personnel
who hall to Ill' fOITl'd to n'turn tn tlu'ir
Comllluni::t honll'lanlk TIH.'Y hall been
e\'en mon' scwrely sllllrkcd by thl'

trl'atnll'nt theH~ relllrnl'Cs had n'("('i\'ed
at the hands of thl' Communists.:! The
hUlllanitarian aspect of the UNC position therefore had greaL appeal.·1
In NO\'emher, General Ridgeway
suhmilled to Lhe JCS his plan on prisoner-of-war negotiations. lIe proposed
to aUempt a one-for-one exchange. If
the Communists agreed, the UNC could
retain or release prisoners who did not
wanL to relurn since it held man}' more
prisoners than did the Communists. If
the Communists insisted upon an alIfor-all exchangl'_ Ridgeway was prepared to agrce.:; The JCS approved
thc.<;e proposals but suggested that
Ridgeway try to geL Communist agreements to a scheme wherehy a joint
UNC-Comlllunist t('am would serc('n
prisoners prior to their release. Those
who indicaLed they did nol desire reo
patriation would remain with their
captor,:.'; When Rear Adm. Ruthven
E. Lihhy entered negotiations on ] 1
December ] 95] as head of the UNC
subdelegation on Item Four, he did
not haye a firm mandate. He was to
~eek a!!rcement on a one·for-one exrhan!!c' therehy insuring the prinl'iple
of \'oluntary repatriation. He was not
to insisl on such an exchange, howe\'er, to the jeopardy of the speedy return of Communist-held prisoners.

Negotiations Begin. The first
a;.!reemcnL hetween Admiral Lihhy and
his Communist counterpart was to exchan;.!e rosLers of the prisoners of war
held hy each side. The Communists'
rosters indicated they held only 7,142
of the 88,000 South Korean soldiers
carried as missing. They admitted to
holding only 3.198 of the 7.1·12 U.S.
persollnel listed as missing. 0 r the
188.000 personnel li,:ted by the Communi,:ts as mi,:sin~. the UNC could
pro\'id(' th(' nam('s of 1( 1)_000 captiws.
As had 11('1'11 fpan'd_ Ihl' COlllllllllli~ts
ill"i"tt'd on an all· for-all ('xl"han!!l'. The
Comnl\lIIi~l~ thl'rl'hy would he ~x-
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(·han;.dni! onl\- ~onlC I 0.000 pri~oner~
for o\'er 100.000. An equi\'alent of
some 10 divisions would he added to
tht' Communist for('e. Admiral T,ihh~
objected to thi~ inequity and furthcr 1Iecused the Communists of not reportin)!.
all the pri~oners they held.
In explaining the discrepancy he·
tween the number of pri~oners the
Communists had hoastcd as h:l\'ini!
captured during the fightinp: and the
numher on thc ro~ters they suhmilled
to the UNC negotiators, the Communists claimed that the lists were small
hecause,
allowed Iho~,' who wanl,·d III
ha('k hOllle and did not wanl to join
a war ap:ain$t their Ilwn counlry (Kol','an5) 10 p:1l hal'k and liw a IlI'acdlll
life at IlIInll', And we direell}, 1'I,!t'a,,('!1
at Ihe front Ihu$\! for('ip:n Ilri~on('r$ (If
war (non·Kor('an~) who did nol wanl 10
join Ihe ,Val' 'al!ain~t IH'"pl(' ,din fip:ht
fill' Iheir n-al indl'j1(,ll(l"nce, who lip:hl
for th('ir own people, These mca5urC5
of ours an' III·rf",·tl}' rip:hl •..•

Similarly. those, \\ho )'('fll~ed )'('patriation \\mdd not hl~ allO\\ecl to take up
arllls a~ain~t the othcr side. The UNC
had not only adopted "volunllll") rcpatriation," it had at the ~allle time
retreated from its original position of
a pure one-for-one exchange, substituting therefore an unenforceable parole
system.'!
Negotiations on the 2' January pro·
p[)~al cont inll('d for the next 3 months.
During the C()lIr~e of these negotiations
the UNC completely dropped the phrase
"one-for-one" and "equal numbers"
from the repatriation principles. The
hasic demand of the UNC became "no
forced repatriation" in lieu of "voluntary repatriation." The Communists,
on their side, conceded that natives of
South Korea held prisoner by the UNC
might have an option, but that Chinese
and North Korean prisoners must he
returned.!I This was an apparent retreat from their previous "all-for-all"
demand.

This claim \\ll~, in cs~en('e. a ~tatcl!lent
[hat the Comllluni!:"ts had allowed their
('apt in's a choice. They had aln'ad~
pral'ticed \'oluntar), rt'patriation.
The UNC presented its first substanti\'e proposal on prisoners of war on 2
January. It was a crueial point in thc
nei!otiations, hel'au~c it wa~ thi~ proposal which Iirst ollieially linked the
UNC to the concept of "voluntary repatriation." Admiral Libby stated that
the UNC would accept the concept that
had been practiced by the Communists_ It would relea~e prisoners who
upon their release could exerci!:"e indi\'idual option as to \\hether to return
to their 0\\ n army or join the c1lpturing ~idl'. It was proposed that tIll' Int('rnational Hed Cros~ supen'ise the
exerci~e of the choice. To alleviate any
military ach'antage, Lihhy IJI'oposed
that pri!'lln('r,; of \\ar in ('X('e~~ of a
olll'-for-Olll' cx('han~e II(' paroled. not
to fi:.rht a~ain a:.rain5t their l·aptor~.

On I April the lINC pl'llll()~ed that
"tlll' rl'll'a~(' and l'l'p:ltriatilln (If ~lll'h
prisoner~ of \\ al' ~hall Ill' ('ITI,(,tl'd (In
the basis of li~ts whieh shall he dll~l'k('d
by and shall be mutually acceptable lCI
hoth sides prior to the signing of the
Arllli~ti!:e Agn',mH'III."
Thl' liNe
added two understandings, ho\\'e\'er,
which clearly held there would he 1111
forced repatriation stating that, "tho~r
who could not be repatriated without
the application of force shall be re·
leased by the detaining power and
resettled ... in a location of their own
choosing ...." 10
In discussi!l,!! thi~ proposal the COlli'
Illuni~ts in~istl'd on brin~ flll'llishrd a
round figure on the numbers of Jlri~IlII'
ers the UNC might return to the COlli'
l11uni~t side. They were told 116,000,
a fii!uJ'(' admill(,llIy ha:·wd on ~t)(':;:;\\'()rk
hilt a :;in(,l't'(' e~tilllat" that the Far Ea~t
COlllllland had furnished the Depart.

, •• Wl'

p:o

A~I-C(,Jl1Cl1t

to

Poll

PI'i!'lonc'I'!'I.
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ment IIf tl\l' Arlll)" in III id-Fl'1!1'IIary_
To obtain more accurate information
it was a~reed that the prisoners would
have to he polled_ Once a~ain, the
Communists appeared to move from
their "all-for-all" position_ General
Ridgeway had prl'\'iously objected to
his superiors in Washington on condurtin1! the prisoner poll, believing that
one of his strongest points was that the
prisoner's ehoice would he expressed
at the exchange point in the presence
of representatives of both sides and
neutral observers.11
Analysis of Motives. As we have
categorized the negotiations, the initial
phase terminated with the agreement
to poll the prisoners. Drfore proccrc\ing to the next phase, the motives bchind the actions taken to date by cach
side should he examined_ On the U_S_
side four objectives can be considered:
1. To obtain the speedy and complete relcase of U.S_ prisoners in Communist camps.
2. To prevent a manpower advantage
from accruinl! to the Communists.
3. To a\'oid forring anti-Communist
prisoners back into Communist control.
4·. To achievc a psychological victory
O\'er the Cllnnl1unists by iIIustrat in~
that a substantial numhrr of their
soldirrs did not drsire to return til the
Comlllunist Promised Lane\.
The first ohjectivc was o\'erriding,
and in order to achieve it HIC sccond
ohjective had been abandoned early
with the substitution of thc unenforceahle parole feature for the initial "onefor-one" position. In compromising
on the one-for-one principle, howevrr.
it became more difficult to achie\'e the
third objcetive without forcing a loss
of faee on thr Communisls and thrrchy
rau~(' a IHlnll'ning IIf Il\I'ir po~itilln and
a SUhSI'I\UI'nt faillll't, til ~ain tile' lir~1
ohjel'tin" ,'rhill' Ihl' second ohjC'ctiw
then was eompatihlr with the third.

huth wen' ill opposition tu IIIe' fir~l.
The second objective the United States
was willing to roncede, but not the
third. Once puhlie opinion was marshaled behind the principle of no
forced repatriation, the UNC negotiators' flexibility was lost. It is one thing
to compromise to gain agreement; it
is quite another to compromise on a
humanitarian principle.
At this stage of the negotiations the
United States cannot be accused of
merely atlempting to score a psychologiral victory by demonstrating that
many prisoners wcre not desirous of
returning to the good life of a Communist socicty. Thc prisoners had not
heen polled to determine their views,
anel whilc thc UNC may have suspected
that many would not want to return,
they did not know how many would
refuse. It can only be concluded that
the U.S. purpose was essentially humanitarian.
The objectives behind the Communist position are more difficult to determine, and we must, to a degree. speculate on their suhstanGe. Fir~t. til(' lIl0re
than I 00.000 pri~olll'rs in" UNC ('amps
rl'pn'sl'ntell a consillerable military asset that the Communists undoubtedly
would have preferred to recover. Second, the Comlllllllists prohahlr lll!lil'vl'd, anel not mistakenly, that any
pri~olll'rs that wer(' not returned to
tlwm would he reh'ased to serve Chian1!
Kai-shck and Syngman Hhee. Third,
the Communists may have suspected
that many of their personnel would
refuse rcpatriation. They knew full
well that the Chinese soldiers were not
\'oluntcrrs, that lllany of the Chincse
prisoners were ex-soldiers of the Nationalist armies and many of the Koreans ex-soldicrs of the Army of South
KorC'a. i\lass refusal to he rqmtriatrc\
"ollid ('un~lilul!' a llIajor ps~ I'holo~i(·:t1
IIt'fl"al.
All of the r('a~on" outlined ilbon'
lllay han' plap'd a part in the dl'eision
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of the COllllllllllis(:< to h!' ohstillalP (III
til<' mailer of prisoncr exchan;!l'. What
apppars e\'pn more likely, hOln'Yer. is
that thp Comlllu:lists eOllsitien,d till'
U.S. prisIlller5 in their hands to hc all
asset ,,"hidl should not he pxpended
prl'maturriy. A~rcement had not )'Pt
hef'n rpached on other issU('s of tl}(~
armistice. Hefusing- to ag-ree on pris.
oner repatriation, the Communists 1'1"
tained har~aininf! power that they could
apply to ~ain concessions on other issues, not only in the Korean ne;!otiations hut, if required, elsewhere in the
cold lrar. The Comlllunists may hm'e
looked to a future wl1(>n puhlir pa·
tience within the United States and its
allies would ;r1"01I' thin. The a~itation
to stop the war, to 1"('('O\"('r prisllllers,
('olllcl cause deeJl dissention within thc
United States and hctween the United
States and its 'allies. Unfellered hI',
any hUlllanitarian roncern for their
Oil II personnel or for the prisoners they
held, the COlllmunists refused to ~in'
up their ~reall'st ne;;otiatin~ asset.
Whatpn'r motin's lIlay ha\"(~ ;!uidl'd
the partips in the ne!!otiations. mlll"h
of the dis('ussioll lias characterized h~
lpp:al arp:ulllellts on the interpn'tatioll
of the GpncI'<l Conl"Cntions of II) )I).
Thc Communist side presented a "Iit('l"·
alist" arp:unH'nt hased on tlH' (irst para!!raph of artide I III IIhich r!'ads.
"Prisoners of war shall he rdeasl'd alld
n~pat riat('d without delay after the ('('Ssation of hustilities." They thell cited
article 7 which statcs that, "Prisoners
of war may in no circumstances renounce in part or entirety the ri~hts
secured to them hy the present Convention . . . " I:!
Opposed to the literal interpretation
of the Communists was the UNC interpretation that in considering the conyention in its whole context there was
nothin~ to l('ad one to heliel'e a prisoner of war mu,.:t hl' fnrcpd to rl'lurJI
hOllle when that \I as 110t his de:<ir('.
TIIP lINC maintained that the ('onn'n-

--

tion insurcd an opportunity to!!O It 0 III!'
hut did not ne~alt' the right of a state
to I!rant political a!'ylul1l to an inclividual II"l1l'n it S(~"'(:ted to C\O so. The
UNC r;olltenclecl that the spirit of the
GOllYcntion, to protec:t the individual
ri~hts of prisoners of war, clearly
would be violated by forcible return. I :1
The UNC was correct in that the
drafters of the convention had not
envisaged a detaining power having
to usc force to return a prisoner of
war to his homeland. Article 118 had
heen wriuen under the assumption that
the great majority would desire repatriation, so that the guarantee of this
right was of primary importance. An
amendment hy Austria had actually
propo!<('d provisions for voluntary reo
patriation but had been rejected on
the grounds that such provision might
be used to the detriment of the prisoner
of war and allow undue coercion hy
the detaining power. 14
The UNC argument, however, was
not uniYersally convincing. After the
conclusion of the armistice, Adlll. C.
TUrllPr .loy. senior llNC dl'ie~ate, express('d I"('sel"\'ations, stilting that "the
prin('ipln of voluntary repatriatioll was
an arhitrary one, commanding no soli (I
sUJlJlort in the Geneva Conventions ex·
('cpt hy ullilat!'ral int!'rpn'tatioll of
that ('OIl\"Cllant" and that tlte COIIIIIIII'
nist illt('rpretation that the Geneva Convcntion required the return of all pris.
oners to the side of their origin was
"a correct literal interpretation of that
convenant." l!j
Perhaps the arguments of the UNC
would have found more widespread
support if they had contained less lofty
appeals to humanitarianism and morC'
le~al substance. Article 118 calls for
rcZease and repatriation. Forcible n'·
patriation obviously would have reo
quircd d<'t<'lItioll and repatriatioll
throu!!h c'on\"l'yaIH'(' of t!J(' pri!'onl'r (If
\I ar under !'onw :'ort of n':'traint tn tIll'
anthllriti(':< of hi!' own ('ountry.1II
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TIll' apJleal of the Conlll1uni~ts to
the Geneva Conventions was entirely
cynical. Aclmi ral Libby had pointed
out to them that ther themselves had
already practiced voluntary repatriation. They violated repeatedly other
articles of the convention, such as the
requirement of furnishing rosters of
prisoners to the International Red
Cross, allowing' inspection by that
hody, and the proper marking of prisoner-oC-war camps - not to mention
their maltreatment of prisoners, as
was revealed later.

III -

KOREA: THE DEADLOCK

The Polling of Prisoners. On
8 April screening of prisoners of war
commenced in the UNC camps. No
effort was made by the UNC to influence prisoners to refuse repatriation.
Quite the reverse was true. The UNC
leaned over backwards to encourage
prisoners to choose repatriation. At
UNC insistence the Communist negotiators had provided an amnesty statement that was read to all prisoners
prior to the screening.! The screening
was completed on the 15th. The results were as shocking to the UNC as
to the Communists.
On 19 April the Communist negotiator was inCormed that of the 170,000
military and civilian prisoners in UNC
hands, only about 70,000 would return to the Communists without the
use of force: 7,200 civilian internees;
3,800 South Koreans; 53,900 North
Koreans; and 5,100 Chinese. Whatever reason the Communists initially
had for wanting an all-for-aIl exchange
was now submerged in their need to
overcome the psychological blow and
propa~anda oeCeat causrd by over onl'half of tlll'ir pl'rslllllwl rl'fusin~ to rt'turn hOllle. TIl(' CunJlllunists felt tht')"
had been d~liberately deceh'ed by be·
ing furnished the U6,OOO figure only

to h,n-e it reduced to 70,OOOY They
Celt they had been duped and led into
a propa~an"tla trap. They had certainly
fallen into a trap; hut the UNC, in its
ignorance of the true extent of the
prisoners' feelings, had not known itself of the trap's existence.

The Package Proposal. The next
move by the UNC, and one long in
preparation in the event that the Com·
munists did not accept the results of
the prisoner poll, was to present a
package proposal that the UNC hoped
would resolve all outstanding issues.
The three issues remaining were:
1. Repatriation of prisoners of war.
2. Whether the Communists were to
he allowed to rehabilitate airfields in
North Korea that had been destroyed
by U.S. bombings.
3. Whether the U.S.S.R. could serve
as a member of the Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission.
The UNC proposal conceded the airfields issue in exchange for a concession on naming the U.S.S.R. to the
commiSSIOn. The UNC position on
"no forced repatriation" was substantially unchanged, however. Admiral
Joy presented this proposal in executive plenary session on 28 April. The
Communists, still smarting Crom the
results of the camp screening, rejected
it, but the only unresolved issue now
remaining was the repatriation of prisoners of war. The negotiations were
in complete deadlock as the UNC had
officially taken its "final and irrevocable position." 3
War in the PW Camps. Communist efforts now turned to a massive
and worldwide propaganda campaign
to discredit the screening of prisoners
that hao rcsuheo in over half of their
eaptnrt'd Jlt'n;olllll'l rdll~in~ to rl'lul'll
to the COllllllunist side. In this dImt
they exploited thoroughly the incredibly bad administration and lack of
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control in th!' pri~()n('r-()f-war ealllp~
of the U_N_ Command_ The U_N_ authorities in charge of the camps did
not know at the start of the negotiations exactly how many prisoners they
held, who they were, or what their
desircs might he' toward repatriation_
In certain compounds they did not
have internal control of the prisoners.
such control having passed to Communist organizers inside the fences.
The camp authorities had simply failed
to visualize that hard·core Communist
prisoner p;roups would grow up inside
the <'rowded cumps and that the leadership of these groups could still receive
instructions from and remain responsive to the Communist command in
North Korea:'
As early us September 1951 violence
had taken place in the camps, Communist leaders ha~'ing murdered 18 prisoners after trial hy a self-appointed
"people's court." On 18 December 14
prisoners died in riots as Communist
and anti-Communist prisoner faetions
fought to control the compounds. In
Fehruary 1952 when U.S_ troops entered a compound containing .').600
Korean civilian internees in order to
~creen out hard·core Communists the)
were attacked by some 1,000 to 1,500
prisoners. In the resulting fip;ht 77
prisoners wcre killed, but the compound was not screened. On ] 3 March
Communist prisoners stoned their Korean guards_ Twelve prisoners were
killed in the retaliation that ensued.
During thc screening in early April,
~e\"Cn compounds containing 37,000
North Koreans refused to submit to
screening. They were all counted as
desiring repatriation_ The prime example of Communist control within
some of the compounds and its direction from North Korea in order to
discredit the screeninp; process occurred on 7 l\lay. On that date till'
lJ.S. gcneral oilierr in l'onlllJanri at
Koje Do was captured by the prison-

('\"~. 1\('ld insidl' tl\(' e(llllp(llInd for :~
days, and tried by a prisoner court.
He was released after the new commander signed what amounted to admission of U.S. brutality in carrying
out the <creening. The Communists,
of course. gave this unwilling admission worldwide puhlicity as well as
demanding explanations at the negotiating table_
On ]0 June the UNC finally regained
control of the Communist compounds.
To do so required a ballle in whieh
:n prisoners were killed (mall)' hy the
COllllllunistg themgch-pg). In one compound peaceably put under control,
bodies of 16 prisoners murdered. by
their fellow inmates were found."
The disorders in the prisoner-of-war
camps were exploited to the maximum
by the Communists, not only at the
negotiating table but by their worldwide propaganda apparatus. Even in
friendly countries such as Britain and
Japan responsible persons were expressing opinions which indicated serious weakening of the international
support that the UNC had been receiving on its screcning program and on
the principle of voluntary repatriation.
The Communists had purposely nnd
effectively employed their personnel in
the prison camps ag a propaganda
\vl'apon ami negotiating ass(!t. u
Despite the flat Communist rejection
of the package proposal of 28 April
and the constant stream of inver·th'e
the UNC negotiators had to endure,
screening of prisoners continued during April and May. By June the last
compound had been screened with
83,071 prisoners requesting repatriation and 86,867 stating they would
resist it. It was almost a year aftrr
the armistice negotiations had he~\In
that the UNC negotiators had accura\('
data on which to base repatriation
IlI'~otiationg_

Attempts to Bargain.

In July
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the Communists indicated for a third
time that they might be willing to
compromise on their position. While
considering in executive plenary session the prisoner-of-war article of the
draft armistice, the senior Communist
delegate frankly told General Harrison, now UNC senior delegate, that the
UNC must come up with a figure approximating 110,000 repatriates and
that this figure must include all Chinese prisoners.; General Harrison then
released to them the 83,000 figure ob·
tained in the latest screening. The
Communists rejected the UNC list once
again. The UNC had held firm to "no
forced repatriation."
On 23 September General Harrison
proposed to the Communists three op·
tions which it was hoped would save
Communist face. All three choices retained the prihciple of no forced repatriation and provided for transporting nonrepatriates to a demilitarized
zone. The options varied as to how
further determination of the nonrepatriates' status was to be made, such
determination being either obsen'ed
or conducted by combinations' of International Red Cross and joint militan' commissions. On 8 October the
CO~lmunists rejected this proposal, and
the Iw~otiations recessed on the initiative of the UNC.!!
The recess of the negotiations closes
our third phase of the negotiations.
The allempt by the UNC to trade a
concession on airfield rehabilitation
for a concession on repatriation had
failed. The Communist concessions
had narrowed the controversy to Chinese captives who did not desire to
return to the volunteer army, but the
deadlock seemed permanent. The UNC
coulcl not alter its position without
either renouncing a moral principle or
admill iug that its screening pro!'l'ss
was as {lishulll'st as the Communist
propaganda claimed it to ht'. The Communists, on the other hand, had suffered

psychological defeat before the world
audience and a loss of face that they
would not accept.
When the UNC agreed to the Communist suggestion that the prisoners
be polled and when the results became
known, both sides found themselves
suddenly in a position from which only
surrender rather than negotiation was
possible. The objectives of both sides
had, in the end, been determined by
the sum of the individual desires of
14,000 captured Chinese soldiers.
11

Unilateral Release. Late in June
the UNC began the release of 27,000
Korean civilian internees. This was
the first unilateral release of prisoners
by the UNC, and even though they
were classified as civilian internees
rather than prisoners of war, the Communists objected bitterly. They were
informed that the release was an internal affair of the South Korean Government and the UNC negotiators reo
fused to discuss it further.!! General
Harrison suggested at this time that if
the Communists failed to accept the
revised screening figures (83,071 repatriates'), the UNC should unilaterally
release the nonrepatriates, presenting
the Communists with a fait accompli.
Sneh a SdlClllC might have pel'lnilled
the Communists to save face and
thereby speed agreement. Harrison's
superiors did not approve. 10
Actually, the idea of unilateral release of -nonrepatriates had been suggested to General Ridgeway as early as
Fehruary 1952 by Secretary of the
Army Earl D. 10hnson and Vice Chief
of Staff for the Army General 10hn E.
Hull, during a visit to Tokyo. Ridgeway had feared then that if the UNC
followed such a plan it would not only
o(1l'n ilself to charges of dl'ceit hut
would ('llI!;\IIger Ih(· !iYl's of prisol\('rs
in Communist hands. lI
In October the lINC reclassified
11,000 South Koreans from "prisoner
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of war" to "civilian internee" and hegan to release them_ The Communist
protests were again ignored_ Once
again General Harrison suggested that
if the Communists persisted in demanding forced repatriation, the UNC
should release all the nonrepatriates.
Gen. Mark W. Clark, the new U.N.
Commander, like General Ridgeway
before him, was not ready to accept
this suggestion. 12

The General Assemhly Dehates.
Until the breakdown of the talks in
October 1952, the United Nations General Assembly had taken no part in
the negotiations. Partly to counter
Communist propaganda and partly to
put the weight of the General Assembly
behind the principle of no forced repatriation, the Secretary of State deli\'ered in the U.N. Political Committee
a 3-hour review of the history of the
Korean question. In his speech Dean
Acheson pointed out that the U.S.S.R.
had accepted the principle of voluntary
repatriation in the Treaty of BrestLiton.k in 1918 and that twice during
World War II the Russians had ofTered
what amounted to \'oluntary n'pat riation to German soldiers at Stalingrad
and Budapest. He also stated that the
conflict oY(>r repatriation had hl'en
"wholly unexpected" and "surprising"
to the U.N. CommandP
India took the initiative in ofTering
on 17 Novemher a resolution to the
General Assembly. This resolution, after discussion and amendment, appro\'ed repatriation of all prisoners of
war following the signing of the armistice. All prisoners of war would be
turned over to a 'Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in a demilitarized zone. The Commission would
make en'ry efTort to facilitate their
return hut, "forre shall not 11(> uSC'cl
a)!ainst prisoners of war to pn'\,('nt or
efTect their return to their homelands."
Each side would be free to explain to

tl\(' prisone."!; tlll'ir ri~hts, and all prisoners who had not chosen repatriation
after 90 days would be referred to the
politiral conference proYided for in the
armistice agreement. If this conference
did not settle the nonrepatriates' fate
within ;>,0 days, the prisoners would
be turned o\,er to the United Nations
for disposition,H
The U.S.S.R. and the Communist
hloc were adamant against the resolution. It was roundly denounced by
SO\'iet Foreign Minister Vishinsky and
Oil 28 NO\'ember flatly rejected by
Chou EII-Iai. On 3 December a
U.S.S.R. counterresolution calling for
forcible repatriation was voted down
and the Indian resolution adopted 54
to 5, only the Communist bloc oppos·
ing.
While there was little chance of the
Communists accepting the resolution,
it did demonstrate to the Communists
that world opinion as represented in
the General Assembly was still on the
side of voluntary repatriation despite
the Communist propaganda and contriwd disorders in the prisoner-of-war
camps.
As till' Cenl'ral Ass(·mhly (·Oll('llllh·t!
its ddmtes. the Presidcnt-eieet of till'
United States. General Eis(>nhowl'l"
II as \'isi ting Korea. 1I is d(·(·larat ion
at the end of his \'isit on G J)eceml)('r
characterized as ill-founded any hope
the Communists might have heltl that
the incoming administration would ill'
Il"iIIing to compromise on voluntary
rcpatriationYi After the Republican
administration took officc, the schemc
of unilateral releasc of the nonrepatriates was once ap-ain recollllllcIUll·d.
this time by Gcneral Clark. III Ewnt:;.
howe\·cr, soon ovcrcame further di~·
cllssion of the concept and its implc.
mentation.
1'h(> fOllrth pilasC' of the ncg(}tiatiun~
carried 11<1 ('hang(' in till' "asi,' \lu:;itiCln
of each side. 1£ mcasured by fon'ill;!
the UNC to compromise on the prill'
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ciple of no forced repatriation and hy
persuading other nations to ahandon
the lINC position, the COllllllunists'
propa~anda campaign and its supporting disorders in the prisoner-of-war
eamps had been a failure. The U.S.
presidential election had been completed, and a new administration was
in oflice. There was no indication,
however, of a weakening of U.S. policy
in the Far East.

IV -

KOREA: AGREEMENT

The Key Concession. On 22 Feb·
ruary 195:1 General Clark proposed
to the CommunisLs an immediate exchange of all sick and wounded prisoners of war. The Communist reply of
28 March agreed to the UNC proposal.
Liaison officers met on 7 April, and
on 9 April the exchange of sick and
wounded prisoners of war was agreed
upon. The exchange, dubbed "LiLLIe
Switch," took place from 21 through
26 April. On the UNC side 5,19·1
Korealls, 1,030 Chinese, and 4-16 ciYilian internees - a total of 6,670were returned to the Communists in
exchange for 68·J. prisoners of war, including 1·19 U.S. personnel. Each side
had rdea:;ed approximately 5 percent
of the prisoners it held.
As gratifying as the exchange of
sick and wounded prisoners was to
the UNC, even more promlsmg was
the hint of a break in the Communist
position contained in their reply of
23l\larch. In it the Communists stated
"seulement of the question of exchanging sick and injured persons on both
sides during the period of hostilities
should be made to lead to the smooth
seLLlement of the entire question of
prisoners of war . . . ." 1 This was
fnllll\\('d h~ a statl'nlt'nl on :W i\lar("h
by Chou En-Iai whi("h appeared 10
contain the key concession. Chou stated
that both sides,

o
~I\IIIII" !lAdertake III rcpatriah o illlo
flIcdialt oly aft,or tl ... c:c:s~ation (If hostilili,o" all of thos" pri,CII"o"" of war in thc:ir
cuslody 11'110 i1lo,io'/ IIpOIl repa/riatiOIl
[italics added] and to hand over the re·
flIaininl!: prisoners of war to a neutral
"laIc ~o as to ensure a just solution to
the 'Iuestiun of their repatriation."
0

•

Negotiations Resume.
While
Chou's statement olTered much promise,
Ihere were still many questions to be
ans\\ ered and clari lied. lL was agreed
to resume plenary sessions on the matter on 26 April. The long recess was
at an end. Initial negotiations were
based on a Communist proposal, and
it quickly became evident that there
were three major areas of disagreement. Two concerned the explanations
Ihat were to he made to the no moepatriates, where they were to he held
and how long would he allowed for
them. The CommunisLs wanted 6
months in a neutral state, the UNC
wanted 60 days in Korea. The third
was Ihe selection of the neutral state.
At this point General Harrison threatened that if the talks broke down again,
Ihe liNe would unilalerally release all
prisoners who did not desire repatriation.:!
On 7 May a new Communist proposal was tabled. In it the question of
tran~porlin~ J\()J\!"!'patriates physic-ally
out of Korea was conceded and a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission
suggested. Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Switzerland, Sweden, and India were
the proposed members of the commission; each was to furnish an equal
number of armed personnel and to
share in the task of maintaining custody of the nonrepatriates in their original places of delention. This plan
bore a close resemblance to that contained in the General Assembly resolution and was hrlieved hy the UNC to
pro\" ide' a hasis for III'1~Clt ia ling 1111 1lC'(°l'Jltahll' armistice.
The U.S. Government desired that
four conditions he added to the pro-

306
posa!. Firsl, unanimily should Iw IIII'
basis of business conducted hy the Repatrialion Commission_ Second, a time
limit of ?,O days should he imposed
upon the political conference for settling the nonrepatriates' future_ Third,
India alone should furnish all the
armed forces and operating personnel.
Finally, not more than 90 days could
be allowed for the Communist explanations to the nonrepatriates_ These four
conditions were put to the Communists
in a counterproposal on 13 May_ The
conditions were not accepted_ 4
On 25 May the UNC suhmitted a
revised proposal. In it the UNC continued to insist that all armed forces
and operating personnel he Indian. It
also held out for a maximum of 90
days for explanations. The unanimity
issue was conceded; majority rule for
the commission as desired by the Communists was accepted. The UNC would
agree either to tum disposition of the
nonrepatriates over to a political conference with a 30-day time limit and
then release them, or alternatively let
the U.N. General Assembly determine
their disposition. 5
On .f. June the COllllllunists accepted
the l.!NC conditions, and by 3 J lInc
stafT officers of both sides agreed on
the final delails of tlw terms of rderence for handling prisoners of war.
As the third anniversary of the start
of hostilities and the second anniversary of the start of negotiations approached, it appeared that an armistice
was finally in sight.

Syngman Rhee Ohjects. The
UNC and the Communists had agreed,
but the Government of South Korea
led by the doughty Syngman Rhee was
not yet to he reconciled. Rhee's objections to the armistice stemmed from
his lifelong and ('ontinuing ohjI'd i\'('
of a free unifil'l] Korl'a, an ohjl'('\i\'(~
that the United Statcs and its U.N.
allies had long since abandoned. As

l'I~ga rds sp,'c'i fic'" (I y thc: a1-\I'I'c'/llI'nt on
handling prisoners of war, RI1l'C insisted that no Inclian troops would he
allowed on the territory of the Repuhlic
of Korea, that Communists explainers
would not be allowed in his rear
areas, and, finally, that no Korean
prisoners would be turned over to
troops of India, a nation Rhee considered as having Communist inclinations."
How far Rhee was willing to go to
upset the approaching armistice could
only be p.lIessed hy U.S. offic:'ials. On
18 .June thei r fears were confirmed.
Bctween midnight and dawn that clay,
with the collusion of South Korean
seeurity troops, approximately 25,000
anti-Communist North Korean prisoners of war escaped. By the end of June
only 8,600 Korean nonrepatriates remained of the some 35,400 confined on
17 June. Syngman Rhee had carried
out what had heen practiced previously
by the Communists and what had often
been considered by U.S. officials: he
had unilaterally released prisoners of
war who did not desire to he rC'paI ria I l'cl. While the UNC had ronsidl'red
sueh a lllC'aSIlI'C as a possihle means of
expediting an armistice, Rhee had used
it as a means by which he hoped to
forestall an armistice.
The UNC was 1I0W faced with 11l'~O
tiating on two fronts. There was the
task of gelling Rhee's acceptance of
the armistice alld the task of persuadin~ the Communists to continue negotiations despite Rhee's release of prisoners. The first task was accomplished
by Mr. Waller Robertson, Assistant
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, who in long conYel'sations with
Rhee between 2.J. June and 11 July reaffirmed once again that no anti-Comlllunist prisoners would be reluJ'Jlrd
10 the COllllllunist sicle ancl won Hlll'l:'S
I'oopl'ralion with tlw arlllistic','.

Agreement and Repatriation.
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The task of continuing negotiations
with the Communists proved less difficult than winning the reluctant cooperation of Syngman Hhee. The
negoti'atipns had been interrupted O!l
20 June as' a result of the unilateral
prisoner release, plenary sessions not
resuming until 10 July. By 19 July
the Communists indicated a willingness
to go ahead with an armistice. A supplementary agreement on prisoners of
war was then completed, providing that
alI nonrepatriated prisoners of war
would be delivered to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in the
demilitarized zone. Rhee's conditions
of having neither Indian troops nor
Communist explainers on South Korean soil were thus satisfied. The Armistice Agreement was signed by the
respective commanders on 27 July
1953.
.
On 23 September the UNC turned
over more than 22,000 nonrepatriates
to the Neutral Nations Repatriation
Commission. Of the 14·,701 Chinese
nonrepatriates turned over, II-W elected
to rl'turn to COlUmunist control, 12
went to India with the custodial force,
and 1.1·,235 returned to UNC control.
Of the 7,900 Korean nonrepatriates,
183 returned to the Communists, 7·1.
went to Imlia, and 7,()() I. were relurned
10 UNC control. By JI) Fehruary 1!J5 I.
the ·Chinese under UNC conlrol had
been moved to Taiwan and the Koreans
released. In alI exchanges, including
Ihose of Ihe sick and wounded in
April, m,121 UNC-captured prisoners
were rl'patriated, some 27,000 short of
what Ihe Communists had indicated
willingness to settle for in July of the
previous year.
The last phase of the prisoner of
war negotiations was marked by Ihe
complete ('apilulalion by the Communisls on the principle of nonforeihle
r('palrialion. Whcn Choll En-Iai 1lI.\(It,
his annClllllcellll'nt on :n i\Iarch I 1)5:~.
there was, in essence, agreement thaI

no prisoner of war would be fon·ell
to return to the side from which he
was eapturell From Ihat dale it is
apparent IIOW that the Communists desired to end the Korean situation. The
final agreement on the disposition of
the nonrepatriates was not fundamentally difTerent from General Clark's proposals to the Communists of 28 Septemher 1~52 or from the General
Assembly Resolution of 3 December
1952.
We can only speculate as to the
motiYes behind Ihe Communist decision to con('ccle on the repatrialion issue and conclude an armistice agreement. The concession was, however, a
significant item of the "peace ofTensive"
that followed the death of Stalin on 5
March 1953. The reasons behind this
"peace ofTensive" were undoubtedly
val"ied and may have been quite unrelated to tIte prisoner-of-war issue or
even to the Korean situation.; The
concession on repatriation at this time
does demonstrate, nevertheless, that
prisoners of war in Ihe Communist
view are to be used to faeililatc political maneuverings and to serve political
objectives.

v -

LEGACY ANn LESSONS

The Negotiations in Retrospect.
A striking feature of these long negotiations was that the only true negotiating,
in the sense of give and take, occurred
between December 1951 and April
1952. Once the UNC had made its
"final and irrevocable" offer, its principle of voluntary repatriation was 1I0t
negotiahle. From December unlil April
the UNC had moved from a "one-forone" position to that of "no forced
repatriation," and the Communists had
Illoycd frolll "ali-for-aIl" to ali apparl'nt
willillgnel<s 10 an·l'pt a ri~ure of l<llllll'
116.000 repatriall'''';. Arter April 1%2
the COllllllunist ofTer to accept volun-

308
tar}, repatriatioll for South Koreans
and the later offer to accept a figure of
llO,OOO, if it included all Chinese, were
both rejected by the UNC. The UNC
efforts to have the Communists accept
voluntary repatriation by cloaking it
in various procedural arrangements at
the transfer point were equally fruit·
less. Only when the Communists con·
ceded could the armistice be brought
about.
It should be recognized that the
Communists ~howed more flexibility
in th.ese negotiations than the UNC.
Although they had themselves applied
\'oluntary repatriation, they insisted
in the beginning of negotiations upon
the principle of complete repatriation.
From this position they went to partial
voluntary repatriation and finally
agreed to the UNC principle. Prisoners
of war apparently were to be used for
wha,tewr advantage the Communists
might gain from them under a particular set of circumstances.

Voluntary
Repatriation - A
Legacy. The inflexibility of the U.N.
position and the possibility of its haying heen a major cause of prolonging
the Korean war gave rise to the question whether e~tabli~hing the principle
of voluntary n'patriation was worthwhill!. Th(· long additional 1I10nths
li.N. personnel had to endure in Communist pri~on camps anclthe additional
casualties suffered on the battlefield
were indeed a high cost. Admiral Joy,
writing after the armistice was concluded. deserihed the cost as follows:
'\'olllntary r('palrialion' plac('d Ihe
welfare of ex·Commllni~t ~oldiC'r:; ahon'
that of our own Unil('d Nations Com·
mand persollll('1 in Communist prison
camps, and abo,'C' Ihat of our Unil,'d
Nalions Command "liII nn 1111' hall I,'
\'nhllliary n'l'alri:tlinll I'n~1 II~ 1I\'('r :1
n'ar nf \lar. :II1l1 .'n~1 nllr lllli,,'.! Na,
iinns C"IlIlIl:\IHI pri~"I\('r" in Cnmmuni,,1 .'amp~ a Yt'ar nf caplivilY, Th.,

lInilt'!1 Nalilln~ Command ~ufT.'n'd al
!t'ast 50,000 casuulli!'s in IhC' eonlinuing
Korean War while we argued to protect
a Jf'sscr numher of ex·Communisl~ whn
did not wish tn r!'lunt 10 Communism.'

If it was thought that in the future
Communist soldiers, recaIling the
terms of the Korean armistice would
desert in mass, then conflicts at the
Bay of Pigs, on the India-China border,
and in Vietnam have failed to bear out
the theory. President Eisenhower,
however, taking a longer view of the
principle's influcnce on thc future,
stated:
The armistice in Korea [has] inaugu·
rated a new principle of freedumthat prisoners of war are entit\('d to
ch(ln~e the side 10 which Ihl')' will he
releasC'd. In its impact upon history,
that one principle may weigh more than
any hallIe of our time.'

Whether insisting on voluntary reo
patriation was correct or not at the
time of Korea, we are already seeing
its impact on the future. The United
States and its allies in Korea sacrificed
heayily to establish Ihis "new principle of freedom." Even if the sacrifice
was a mistake in Korea, it cannot be
cOlTecled now. In negotiations oVer
the prisoners of war of Vietnam which
Illay I)(~ 11l'11I in IIIl' fill lin', IIIl' "n('\\'
principle of frecdolll" cannot he ahan·
doned. Voluntary repatriation, for
better or for worse, is Korea's legacy
to Vietnam.

Lessons from Korea. Though reo
versal of our Korean position of voluntary repatriation is not a feasihle corrective action to be applied to Vietnam
ne~otiations, it does not mean that
'there are no lessons to be deriyed from
the Korean talks that have value for
Vit'lnam .. Re\'iew of the Korean pris.
()1It'r-of,wal' 1H'~olialiolls clisdost's, ill
Ihi~ wrilt'r'~ opinion. six t'ITOI'~ 1II1111t'
hy till' lilliit'd Slalt'~ Ihal lIIay h:!\'(!
delayed the armistice and hence the
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repatriation of its captured personnel.
They will he discussed below in the
order in which they occurred.
Mistake 1: Not insisting that
prisoner.of.war matters be dis·
cussed earlier in the armistice ne·
gotiations. Discussions on the prisoner·of-war question did not begin
until 5 months after the armistice talks
started. The settling of important issues prior to the prisoner-of-war question heing di~cu~sed meant thaL the
UNC negotiators had few remaining
concessions to make that could be
traded for Communist concessions on
the prisoner.of-war issue. By the time
the "package proposa]," tying the prisoner·of-war issue to other issues, was
offered, the only suhstantive question
yet unresolved was the rehabilitation
of airfields in North Korea. This resulted in the UNC negotiating for the
return of its prisoners, about whom it
cared deeply, while having little to concede except Communist prisoners,
about whom the Communists cared
nothing. The lesson is that arrangements for repatriation of pri~oners of
war should be sellled (or preferahly,
carried out) before the Communists
have gained all the concessions they
eon~ider vita] on other issues. If the
Comlllunists refusc to a~rec on repatriation of prisoners of war, we must
refuse to agree on a malleI' of importance to them.
Mistake 2: Introducing a politi.
cal issue, voluntary repatriation,
into negotiations for a military
armistice. It would be naive to hope
that a military armistice conference
does not ha,'e political overtones and a
political impact, or indeed that such
a ron ference, like war itself, is not a
jlOlitical art. Deliberately inserting the
hi!!-hl~ political issue of vo1!llItary n'patriatinn into the prisonrr-of-war nrgotiations, however, was not in the in-

terest of an early trun!. That the liNe
purpose might have been entirely humanitarian does not alter that conclusion. When the political issue resulted
in a psychological defeat for the Communists, their greatest requirement
became time. Time was needed to
prove that the UNC was hrutalizing
Communist prisoners into refusing repatriation, to allow the United States
and its allies to grow weary of the
issue, and to let the world forget the
results of the screcning. It was almost
a year after the poll hefore the Communists fclt they could afTord a eoncession. Had the UNC continued to
insist, as it did initially, on a purely
military armistice, it could have magnanimously ofTered to exchange a~
many as six prisoners for everyone
received and never have had to bring
up the voluntary repatriation issue. One
cannot state with assurance that this
would have brought about an earlier
armistice, but it would have avoided
the political issue and precluded what
may have appeared to the Communists
either as an obligation to spend months
allempting to discredit the prisoner
]lolling or an opportunity to dclay the
negotiations. The lesson is that there
is a legitimate basis for avoiding politea] i~~lles in a military 'armistice confen!nt:c: it should he exploited when
this is in our interest.
Mistake 3: Not having accurnte
information on the desires of pris.
oners of war as to their repatria.
tion. Had the UNC decided not to
introduce the political issue of voluntary repatriation into the armistice
talks, it could not, in fact, have offered
a 2, 3, or 6 to 1 exchange because of
its abysmal ignorance of the human
'material it had in its camps. Its prisonC'r-of-wur ramps were operatC'd with
tht' so]p intention of k('('pin~ nt'utra]i1.l'ti
the confillcd manpower whilc complying with the obligations of the Geneva
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Prisoner of War Convention. Only
when it was decided to use this man·
power in negotiations did the UNC discover the complications involved.
Had the UNC negotiators realized
the extent of anti· Communist feeling
in the prisoner·of.war camps, they
could have anticipated the Communist
reaction to the results of a prisoner
poll. The chain of events that would
follow could have been predicted and
therefore avoided. As it turned out,
until the results of the prisoner screen·
ing were learned in April 1952, the
UNC had been negotiating in the dark,
insisting upon voluntary repatriation
when such insistence, unbeknownst to
them, was leading inevitably to deadlock. The direct confrontation on thc
principle of voluntary repatriation need
not have occurred had the UNC known
the facts. .j\dditionally, the round
figure of 116,000 repatriates would not
have been furnished and the subsequent
Communist charge of bad faith
avoided. The lesson from this mistake
is to have accurate information on all
factors \\"hich will influence the nep:otiations before discu:::sion::, are startcd.
Mistake 4: Conducting a unilateral poll of prisoners. Once the
Communists agreed to a poll of tlw
prisoners, the UNC should not hayc
conducted the poll unilaterally. If the
results of a UNC.conducted poll turned
out badly for the Communists, they
could claim a fraudulent poll. If the
poll were made by neutral or joint
commissions, the Communists would
have had a much more difficult time
arguing fraud. General Ridp:eway's
early reluctance to conduct the poll and
recommendation that the chore be left
to a neutral commission at the transfer
point were well founded. Once the
Communists learned of the extent of
thc anti·Communist fc(,ling. th('y hat!
no choil't' but to objt'l'I to a !'t'eo III I
poll, cvcn one conductcd hy a neutral.

If a joinl.or ncutral commiSSIOn, on
the other hand, had made the original
poll, and every Communist had expressed a desire to return to his home·
land, it would have been considered
quite normal. The lesson is that the
UNC had much to gain by giving the
poll an aura of legitimacy that was difficult to dispu teo
Mistake 5: Utilizin~ as a propagamla theme the refusal of Communist prisoners to he repatriated.
It is understandable, gil'en the intense
competition of the cold war of the
early 1950's, that any opportunity \\as
seized to demonstrate disillusionment
within the enemy camp. It is equally
truc that with a frc(' and al!gr('::,si\'(~
press the United States is not alwap;
able to present news in a restrained
fashion. Nevertheless, treating the defection of Communist prisoners as a
major ideological victory was definitely
not in the interest of an early armistice
or an early repatriation or' American
prisoners of war. If it had been under!'tood that such a propap:anda yidory
was actually l'ounlt'rpnllhlt·tin' of tIll'
{I.S. ohjecti\'e in Ko\'('a of ohtaining
an honorable cease-fire, that objective
might well have been reached earlier.
\"\Ie were trying to stop the military
pha!'l~ of the war, hut Wl'J'(~ !'till l'am·
paigning vigorou!'l)' 011 the p!'ychological fronL. The lesson, as Admiral Joy
put it, is that "a military armistice
conference is no place to seek a propa·
ganda victory." 3
Mistake 6: Failure to take
greater advanta~e of the schemc
of unilaterally releasing prisoners.
On three separate occasions durin;,!
the negotiations, large-scale releases of
Korean prisoners were made without
the agreclllent of the Communist ~icl('.
TIll' Communi:.;t!', prior til tIte !'tart IIf
thl' nq.!.otiation::'. hall hy tlll'ir lI\\'n
atlllli~!'ion also made large.scalc re·
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leasrs. On at least four occasions unilateral releasc was proposed by senior
responsible U.S. officials. In each case
concrrn that such action would jeopardize the return of American prisoners
was the principal reason for not going
through with the scheme. While thc
Communists objected vehemently on
evcry occasion when the UNC released
prisoners, therc is no indication that
thc release either delayed the armistice
or jeopardized the return of U.S. prisoners.
The release of Korean prisoners
woulcl hm'e been a relatively simple
matter, as Syngman Rhee proved to
everyone's dismay but his own. The
Chinese prisoners were a different matter. Sending them to Taiwan may have
been politically unpopular as Chiang
had been driven from the mainland
only 2 years before and was discredited
in the eyes of much of the world.
Ncvertheless, it was to Chiang that
these people were eventually sent. If
the prisoners who did not desire repatriation had been sent to Taiwan prior
to the start of the negotiations, and
their desire to go to Taiwan confirmed
by neutral observers, there was nothing
that the Communists could have done
but accept the fait accompli. The lesson from this mistake is that if voluntary repatriation is to be practiced, it
should be done unilaterally and before
negotiations have started.
While perhaps not falling in the category of negotiating "mistakes," there
were other difficulties that the UNC
encountered which are important to
the understanding of the Korean prisoners·of-war negotiations. The first
one, causing extreme embarrassment
to the UNC negotiators, was the lack
of firm control over the prisoner-ofwar camps. This was a basic reason
for not knowing the desires of the
prisollrrs of war on repatriation, and it
would have complicated unilateral releases and could have made a shambles

of an) joint or 1\('lItral polling of the
prisoners. It also prcH'ided the means
hy which the unilatcral screcning was
di!'creditcd.
A second difficulty was the lack of
an agreed position with the Government of thc Republic of Korea. That
go\'crnmcnt did not ohject to the formulation of prisoner-of-war arrangements as much as it did to the armistice
itself. Syngman Rhee's prisoner releasc was not successful in prcvcnting
the armistice, but if they had so dcsired it would have prO\'idcd an opportunity for furthrr stalling by the Communists.
Such appear to he the principal errors made by the United States in the
process of establishing the principlc of
voluntary rcpatriation. To determine
if the lessons learned in Korea have
application to the negotiations over
prisoners of war that might evolve in
Vietnam, it is necessary to examine
the current prisoner-of-war situation
there. This is the object of the following chapter.

VI - VIETNAM: THE
PRISONER OF WAR SITUATION
Application of the Geneva Convention. The 191.9 Gencva Convention, relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, is applicable to the
Vietnamese conflict just as it was to
the Korean. Article 2 states that, "the
present Convention shall apply to all
cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict [italics added] which
may arise between two or more of the
High Contracting Parties even if the
state of war is not recognized by ope
of them." The Republic of Vietnam
(Saigon), the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam (Hanoi), and the United
States arc all signatories to the convention. [Editor's note: In the unlikely
event that the conflict in Vietnam is

312
determined to he "not of an inil' I'll ational character," Article 3 of the
Geneva PW Convention would apply_!
Problems generated in that situation
are .beyond the scope of this paper_]
Included in the catep;ories of captives who are to be considered as prisoners of war per article 4. are "memhers
of the armed forces," which certainly
includes the crewmen of U_S_ Air Force
and Navy aircraft, and also "members
. _. of organized resistance movements"
provided they fulfill the following conditions:
... that of b('ing ("ommamled hy a Jll'rson responsible for his subordinates:
that of having a fix('d distinctive sign
recognizable at a di~tance; that of
carrying arms openly; that of condu!'ting their oJll'rations in accordance with
the laws and customs of war.'

Few of the conditions of article 4
are met by the Viet Cong guerrillas,
particularly those pertaining to the requirements to be readily identifiable
as combatants. Nevertheless, in order
to encourage reciprocal treatment of
American and South Vietnamese captives, the United States and the Republic of Vietnam interpret article .'1
liberally' and grant prisoner of war
status to many captured guerrillas who
do not qualify under a literal interpretation of article ,t In general, the
rights of prisoners of war are accorded
to all captives captured under arms
during the course of military operations.:!

The United States! Repuhlic of
Vietnam Program. As was true in
Korea, the United States and its allies
attempt to comply with the provisions
of the convention despite the difficulties
presented by an insurgency situation_
In June 1965 the International Committee of the Red Cross (lCRC) addressed letters to the Governments of
the United States, the Republic of Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of

Vielnam, and 10 Ihe National Liheralion Front remindinp: each of their obligations under Ihe Prisoner of War
Convenlion. In their replies the United
Siaies ancl Ihe Hepuhlic of Vietnam
both assured the rCRC that Lrealment
of prisoners by their forces would be
in full accord wiLh the convenLion. 4
This posiLion was reiterated at the Honolulu Conference of February 1966
where "the leaders of the Lwo governments ... reaffirmed their determination . . . Lo adhere to the Geneva
Conventions of 19·19 on the treatmenL
of prisoners of war ...." r. To carry
out this intent, a prisoner-of-war camp
consLruction program was sLarLed in
Vietnam_ The iniLial camp was completed aL Bien Hoa in the Spring of
1966, the firsL prisoners being interned
there in May of that year. 6
By agreement between the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and the
Government of the Republic of Vietnam, all prisoners of war taken by the
U.S_ forces in South Vietnam are ultimately transferred to the custody of
the Army of the Republic of Vietnam
(ARVN). This procedure is allowed
under article 12 of the convention. The
United States does retain a contingent
responsibility that those prisoners
('aptured hy its forees arc accorded nil
rights as prisoners of war_ 7 In meeting this responsibility, MACV procedures stipulate that American units
will not turn over custody of prisoners
of war except at an established prisoner-of-war camp. Evacuation up to
that point remains entirely under the
control of U.S_ forces. By September
1967, in addition to the camp at Bien
Hoa, camps were operating at Pleiku,
Danang, Qui Nhon, Can Tho, and on
the IIe de Phu Quoc off the southwestern coast of Vietnam. A U.S_ Army
advisory detaehmcmt is present aL e:l('h
of these ARVN-administered installations. s
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Tlw ICRe ha~ a~~unll'd till' humanitarian funelions of the "Protc<'Ijll~
PowC'r" under article 1 0 of the convention. It periodically visits eamps,
inspC"~tin~ conditions and inten-ie\\'in~
prisoners of its own choice without
witnC'sl'es. Additionally, the JCRC
visits hospitals wher£' si('k and wounded
prisoners of war are confined as well
as the temporary detention facilities
operated by U.S_, AltVN, and allied
forces. The ICRC has visited prisons
and jails in South Vietnam where prisoners of war were located prior to
construction of. the prisOll£'r-of-war
camps.!) The press has visited the
campsyl
As Ihe freedom of access accorde-c1
Ihe lr.RC indicah'~. U.S. fOlTC'S and Ihe
Republic of Vietnam make C\'CIT efIort
to comply with the spirit as weII as
Ihe leller of Ihe· G£'neva Convention on
Prisoners of War: despite an earlier and
underslandable reluctance on the part
of the Government of the Repuhlic of
Vietnam to accord prisoner-of-war
status to persons who, from its point
of view. were ~uilty of treason. In
the bailIe conditions in South Vietnam
only Ihe uniformed soldie-rs of thc
North Vietnamese Army are readil)
identifiahle as havin~ the rip;ht of prisoner-of-war sial us. Whe-Iher olh£'r ('apliv£'s arc e-ntitled to prisone-r-of-war
status depends, to a lar~e degr£'e-, upon
the ('ircumslances of their capturC'. UlIIii proper status can he d£'termined, all
captured persons are classified as "detainees." Durinp; screeninp; and interrogation a detainee is determined to
he either a "prisoner of war," a "civilian defendant," or an "innocent
ch·i1ian." The first catel!ory is interned
in a prisoner-of-war camp, the second
transferred to ch'j)'aulhorities for trial,
and Ihe- third is relC'asl'cl. if possihle.
al Ihl- point of appn-llI'nsioll. In douhtful ca,.£,,. till' tribunal IWIlI'I'dun- prl'scribt'll hy artieil- ;; of Ihe conwntion
is appli£'d. 11

Anlllll~ till' COlllnlllni~t Jlri~lIlll'r~ of
war. three I~ PI'S arc found: the North
VietlHlIllC'sc solcli£'r, the South VietIHlIlwse who moved to the Communist
North after the Fre-nch-Viet Minh c£'aselire (If I C)51· and latC'r was infiltrated
back into the south to join the insurp:ent mO\'ement, 3nd the Viet Con~,
\\ ho Illay he a Incal guerrilla or memher of a main force unit but who has
nen-r left South Vietnam. Each poses
a different prohlem concerninp; his
eventual rei case and repatriation.
One further faelor, which thou~h not
part of the tr(,<Itme-nt of prisnner~ of
Wat· has a h£'arin~ on the repatriation
problem, is the amnesty or Clzic/l Hoi
("Opl'n Arms") pro~ram conductec)
hy tht- Ht'lJllhlic' of Vil,tn:lm, \\hil'h assures a Viet Conp: or North Vietnallle~e
Army soldier who decides to return
or defect to go\"(-rnmcnt control that
he may do so without prejudice. Such
persons are sent to special centers
where they are instructed on the goals
of the Saip:on govcrnment and are
~iven training intended to equip them
to lead constructive lives as citizens of
the Republic. They are allow£'c1 to enlil't in the ARVN or return to a ch'ilian
community, exempt from conscription
into ARVN for 1 year. I :!

Tlw COl1l1uUlliMt Attilu(I(~. The
Hanoi government has taken a very
different altitude towanl captured persons than have its adversaries. Although a signatory nation to the 19·19
Geneva Convention since 1957, it has
informed the ICRC that in its "iew
the Prisoner of War Convention is not
applicable due to the lack of a declaration of war. It therefore considers
captured American airmen to be "major criminals," not prisoners of war
who come- within the scope of the
II> II) C('IIl-\'a a~n'e-nll-III.I:l Althoup.h
Ilanni prnft's~I'S that the pri:<olh'r~ ill
ils hands are treated humanely, il has
denied representatives of the ICRC ac-
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Norlh Vil'lnalll. "arlil,tlladr
is Hanoi's refusal to proyide rosters" of prisoners and the lack
of a regular mail sen·ice. Hanoi, in
elTeet, is holding these prisoners incommunicado, and the U.S. aUlhorities
will not know with certainty how many
prisoners are being held and who they
are.
On 6 July 1966 captured American
airmen were paraded throll~h the
streets of Hanoi, and the North Vietnmnese announced that they \l"OlIld he
tried as war criminals. This action
set ofT a wave of protest which included an appeal from 18 "do\'ish"
U.S. Senators, a request from the Secretary General of the United Nalions for
Hanoi to "exercise restraint." and an
appeal from Pope Paul reqlle~lil1~
Ireatment of prisoners "aceordil1~ 10
internalional norms."].1 Realizill~ perhaps Ihat Ire hac! gone too far, thai
carrying through with a trial would
more likely alienate world opinion toward his re,gime than win sympathy for
it, and would tend to unify Ihe people
of the Uniled Slal!'s. setlin~ 01T \\"ithin
the United States a demand for reprisal
(a ]lossihility the Scnator warned
against). ITo Chi l\Iinh annollnGf'<1 on
27 .luly ]966 that an I I-memhcr commission had h!'en pstahlish("c! 10 illYestip:ale U.S. war crimes Imt that IIIl
trials were "in "iew." 1;; Hanoi has not
yet seen fit to r("cognize Ihe applicahilil)' of thc Gencva Convention, ho\\ever, or 10 implemcnt fully its pro\'i5ions.
The National Liheralion Fronl in
Soulh Vielnam has adopled an allilu<ic
similar to Ihat of Ihe GOYernmcnt of
Norlh Vielnam. The Front ass!'rl;; Ihat
it is not hound hy Ihe convention. he"
eause it was not a party to the ct(·liherations Ihal hroughl it aholli. II does
1101 I'onsicler Ihal any of Ihe nlpl ivl's
it holels m"(' pri~onl'rs of \\olr.'" 'I'll!'
Viel COII~ han' ewn puhlid~ announ('ectlhe execulion in ]()OS of thrc!'
di~t'()lIra~ing

('aplut"t'd ll.S. soldi,'rs as a n'Jlri~al for
lit(' execution of Viet Con~ 1('(TorisIH
hy the authorities of the Sai~on re{!ime.1i" The Viel Cong have furni~lJ('d
no informalion on the idenlity, loealion, or numher of prisoners II;at Ihey
hold. Vict Cong confinement areas
on~rrun hy U.S. forces are grim leslimonials of starvation conditions anci
of prisoners hein~ murdered en mas~c
hefore Iheir guards fled. III

Repatriations to Date. Th!' Ge·
neva Convention provides for I'(·palri".
lion of prisoners of war durin:.t ho~tili.
lies, and Ihe Unitect States ha~
repeatedly allempled through varioll~
channels to eflect sueh exchanges. On
8 Drcemher ]C)oo Ihe JeRe annolll\('(,11
Ihat Norlh Vietnam had rejct:ll'cl a pr\l·
posal hy President Johnson for a ("Oil'
ferenc:c undcr Heel Cross atl~pjcc~~ 10
Gow;ider Ihe possibility of rcleasill{! or
exchanging prisoners held hy holh
sides.1l1 In August 1967 the U.S. Ill"
parlmenL of State summarized its efT()rl~
10 arrange a prisoner of war exehall;!1'
as follows:
\'i'1' han' ('olltartc·d hnth Nnrth Vic,tnmn
allll tIl<" Natillnal 1.i1l1'ration «'rullt. ,Ii·
r<"("tly mill through illtc·l"ml'(liaric' •• ttl
prlll'ogp digcug~ion~ of rc'patriatillll, ('~.
.. han:!" or 11th"," malt .. ",; 1"'rtilll"llt til
pri"'lln"r~ of war. On .J Illy 20, 11)(,(,
Prc~idl'lIt Johllson publicly "l'rJ:"",,,1
our willinp;negg to meet with Hanlli I!"'"'
ernnJ('nt on tll<"~(' mailers at a ("lIlf"n'Il""
tahl,' und .. r ~pongor~hifl of tIll" 11111'1"'
national Red Crlls,; Committcl', '1'1 ... In·
ternational Red CroSg, national H",I
Crogs societies, p;overnm"nts mill pri'
yatc ppr~on. have appralpd to ilitll th
Viet lIam and the National Lilwmtillll
Front to diseugs these matlt'r~. I,"t
e,"pry initiatin' has been r.-jcl"ll"l. Utltl!
North Vil'tnam and thl' Vic,t CtllIl! I"·
fusl' to ('omply with thc~,~ \'itul PIII\j.
sin liS of the G.. nm'a Con\'l"ntilln. :111,1
hoth rl"flls,' to (lisCIISS th" lIIult"r ,Ii·
r ..,:tly IIr thrull:!h auy intc'rlll,'di:II~'"''

Despite lhe failure of 1111" l'lIih,,1
States to arrange prisoner.of-war r\·
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change or repatriation on a large
scale, there have heen a numher of
in!'lan('c!' of prisoner release, The
United States has hoped to start a chain
reaction of informal umlegotiated releases, Between January 1966 and
Augu!'t 1967 over 100 North Vietnamese prisoners of war were repatriated
to Norlh Vietnam at the demilitarized
zone astride the 17th parallel. These
personnel were accepted by the Hanoi
re~ime, not as returned prisoners of
war, hut as r.efugees from the south,
Two wounded Norlh Vietnamese sailors
caplurcd in an allack hy North Vietnamese motor torpedo hoats on U_S_
Fleet unils in the Tonkin Gulf were
repatrialed to Norlh Vietnam in June
] 967 throu~h Camhodia, a~ain in hopes
Ihat Norlh Vielnam would reciprocale.
Additionally, in South Vielnam Ihe
Gnvernment hm: released ?,.\. Viet Con~
prisoners of war during the period
January 1966 Ihrouf!h Aup;ust 1967. 21
As of 1 Fehruary ] f)(iS the Viet Can;!
have released nine Ameriean military
prisoncrs. A r('lea!'e of three American soldiers in Cambodia in NO\'emhcr
1967 revealed a new technique hy Ihe
Conllllllnisl!': Ihe men were turned o\'er
to a \'Cprcsentath'e of an American
anlill'ar ;!roup: aceonlin;! 10 Ihc Nalional Lihcralion Front reprcsenlatin'
at Ihe !'C'cne, in rcspon!'e to "the United
Stales llIo\'emcnt of opposition to
Ameriran im'oh'cment in the Vietnam
war.":!2 The sin;!le release that has
heen carried out hy the Hanoi re~ime
lI'a!' C[uite similar. Thrcc capli\'e Ameriran pilOls in company \\'ith Iwo rep·
resenlalives of an American peal'e
!!rOllp were flown from Hanoi 10 V{('ntianC', Laos, and released on 16 F('hruary 1963. Hanoi !'talC'd that the re·
lea!'~ lI'as '\'ivid proof of Ihc l('nicnl
and hUlllanilarian policy of Ill<' ])(,1110'
('rali(' 111'1'1I1,lil' of Vil'llIalll III':-:(lill' tIll'
f;\('1 Ihal IIII' linilt'd ~Ialt':-: ~o\'t'rnllll'lIl
i:, 1'(Il1linuill;! il:' a~;!rC':,:,in' \\ar in
SOlllh Vil'lllalil and illl('n!'ifyin;! ils

homhinp; of the \kllloeratic Repuhlic.
of Vielnam." The lTanoi reprcscntali\'t~ al!'o asked Ihal Ihe two Anwril'an
antill'ar advocatcs "convey our wishes
for still greater successes to the movement of the American people against
the U.S. war in Vietnam.":!:l
COlllmunist Motivcs
toward
P.'isoncrs of War, The hehavior of
the Hanoi regime and the National
Liheration Front regarding the prisonl'rs-of-war question is fully consistent
wilh Ihe image of the conflict in Vietnam Ihe Communists desire to present
to Ihe world. The refusal of Hanoi to
acknowled~e returned prisoners as
memhers of the Army of North Vietnam support!' iL<; contention that no
Norlh Vielnamese Army units are operating south of the ] 7th parallel and
Ihat the conOie! there is a strug~le of
the southerners against an oppressive
r('p;ime. The "war criminal" allegation
a!minsl captured U.S. airmen is consi!'lC'nl wilh the charp;e Ihat Ihe U.S. air
allaeks a;rain!'t North Vielnam con::olilule 1II1\)l'o\'ok('d a!!p;ression and arc.
III a lar~e de~!l"ee, directed against nonmililary tarp;ets. The access given the
forci~1I press (ancl cerlain memhers of
Ihe American pre!'!' Ihat mip;hl ]l(~
:-:~ nll'allll'li(') 10 individual I'ri!'oIH'r:-:
leads onc to helie\'e that the Ilalloi re~ime desires to present itself to the
world as' humanitarian and generous
despite the gravity of the "crimes" of
the airmen. 24
The release of three enlisted soldiers
hy Ihe Viet Con~ and three ofiicers by
Ihe Hanoi re;rime to representatives of
Amcrican peacc groups appears desi;rned to encourage such groups, aid
them in p;aining support among the
Amcriean p('oplc, and therehy divide
fmlht'r Ihe U.s. pulllie opinion a!' 10
1111' Vil'llI:l1II ill\'o,,"I'1I1I'1I1. If lIlt' pur1'0"1' of IIII' COlllnllllli:-:l:-: ha:-: also IWt'1I
III ('hoo:'I' for relurn 10 1111' United
Slale!' pC'rsonncl who would he eOIl-
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yinced of the correctness of the COIllmunist cause and would espouse that
cause publicly, Lhey have not been successfuL In each case, afLer an iniLial
flair' of press interest, the repatriaLes
have slipped quieLly from public view_!!~
The CommunisLs in VieLnam, j usL as
the CommunisLs in Korea before them,
view prisoners of war, both their own
personnel and those they hold, as Lools
of psychological and political warfare.
The prisoners they hold will be mistreated, well treaLed, or released depending upon the political purpose to
he ser\'ecL Their OWII personnel in
anti-CommunisL hands are being
ignored currently by both Hanoi and
the National LiberaLion Front. If it
were in the Communist political interest, however, repetitions of disLurbances such as were experienced on
Koje Do Could 'well be attempted in
order to manuever the camp authorities
to tuke suppressiye measures. \Vere
negotiaLions undertaken, the Communists could profess a soliciLous concern
fOl'- their people that Lhey have not indicated to daLe.

VII -

NEGOTIATING WITH
COMMUNISTS

Having analyzed the Korean negoLiations and having examined the prisoner-of-war situation in VieLnam, there
remains the final task of relaLing the
one to the other_ By so doing, certain
factors can he isolated that will influence the Vietnam negotiaLions as
they did those in Korea. Recommendations can he made that will assist in
avoiding the errors and difficulties that
hampered us in Korea and that, hopefully, will expediLe the repatriation of
Amerkan prisollers of war.
1IlnlU'I1('('~ on Nt'~()li:lli()lls. That
the COllllllunists in Vietnam refuse to
reeognize the Gene\'a Convention on

pri"oJl('rs-!if war :t.~ al'pli(·ahl(· to tlw
situation does, ill their view, relieve
them of the ohli~ation to repatriate
the sick and wounded prisoners dming,
and all of them aL the close of, hostilities. Nevertheless, there have been more
releases during the hostiliLic.c; in ViI,tnam than Lhere were in Korea, where
the Communists did acknow1eclgc the
applicahility of the convention. I f the
Communists in Vietnam continue not
Lo recognize the convention, it is climcult to see how they can delay negotiations through nonacceptanee of our in(('rpn·tat ions of its pr()visiorll~. Tlw
Iwgotiations should therefore revolve
more closely around the real issues instead of being macle to appear as discussions of legal interpretation.
Similarly, the Hanoi regime's pretense that there are no North Vietnamese Army .uniLs in South Vietnam,
hence, no North Vietnamese prisoners
of war, should result in their c1eelinin~
to ewn discuss the problem of \'oluntary repatriation. Hanoi can hardly
demand the return of persons whose
existcnce it denies. Whethcr or 110t
h~ d('~jgn, I blloj. Jws m·oidl·d )l1:ll'il1~
it"l'lf ill a position wh('J"e it ('ould lin
emharras!<ed, as were the Comlllllllists
in Korea, hy the dl'fl'('tion of its PI'I"
''0 II nI'l.
On the othl'l' hand, llanlli's
il1si!<tcl1ec that it is noL im'olved in
Soulh Vietnam will necessitate negotiating wilh two parLies and therefore our
making a double set of concessions in
order to obLain the return of all pris.
oners of war.
In Korca the United SLates 110L only
represenLed the Uniled NaLions hut was
ahle to marshal through the General
Assemhly worldwide nOll-Colllmunist
support ~f its position. The U.S. posi.
tion in Vietnam hardly enjoys sllch
supporL, Loday. Sympathy for the Virt
C()II~ :llltl for Hanoi, hOWI'''I'I', is <11')ll'lIdt'nt upon tlwir lll'ill~ ahlt~ ttl ('tlll'
tinue to condnce sympathizers that
they are the aggrie\'ed parties and vic-
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Iilus of Aml'rican aggression who only
desire to be left alone to settle their
problems. Mistreatment of American
prisoners of war or recalcitrance in
releasing them would he counterproductive to the external image they are
attempting to portray. This is particularly true of the influence of such behavior upon the image they are trying
to project within the United States itself.
The repatriation of prisoners of war
in Korea was eventually elIected
Ihrough the use of the Neutral Nations
Hepatriation Commission. It will be
more difficult for the United States to
find parties that would represent its
view ~n such a commission today and
stilI be acceptable to the Communists.
There is, however, hetter contact between Washington and Hanoi today
than there ever was between Washington and the North Koreans and the
Communist Chinese. The fact that an
American citizen can go to Harioi and
participate in a prisoner release without
being entirely discredited in his homeland is indicative of this contact.

Voluntary Repatriation versus
Code of Conduct. AILhough, as has
been pointed out, the issue of voluntary
repatriation may never he raiscd, it
cannot he discounted. The flexibility
of the Communist position in Korea
must be remembered. If the principle
of voluntary repatriation must be renegotiated in Vietnam, it wiII set up
a definite connict for the United States
with that other legacy of Korea, the
Code of Conduct. The United States
is comll1illed to both yoluntary· repatriation and the Code of Conduct. To
abandon the principle of voluntary repatriation would be to hreak faith with
those Americans who sulIered and died
to estahlish it in 11)52-5:t To fail to
meet it~ ohli~ations unlier Ihe' Code
of Conduct to its llIen now in Viet
Con~ or Norlh Vietnamese prison

('amJl~

would be an equally sorry
breach of faith. The best approach for
the United States is to avoid heing
placed in a position where voluntary
repatriation can become an issue.
Avoiding such a position can best
be achieved hy not holding in prisonerof-war camps any personnel who do
not desire to he repatriated. The Chieu
Hoi program represents the first step
in achieving this goal, for it provides a
means for screening out anti-Communists and disillusioned rebels before
they are categorized as prisoners of
war. Since these returnees are provided treatment superior to that they
would receive in the prisoner-of-war
camps, there is no ohjection from the
lel{C. Since they are, in elIcct, seeking political asylum, which any sovereign nation has the right to grant at
its discretion, the procedure is fully
in accord with the norms of international law. This same right to grant
political asylum can be applied to prisoners of war, thereby remoying from
the prisoner-of-war camps on a continuinp: basis those prisoners who
would hayc to be forced to go back
to Communist controJ.1
To avoid renegotiating the principle
of volnntary repalrialion obviously re!Jllin's a d"plh of ('ontml and I'IJi"il'n('Y
in the administration of the prisonerof-war program that was lacking in
Korea. The political orientation (or
lack of orientation) of the prisoners
must be known, and the prisoners must
be free of coercion from other prisoners
of any political persuasion. lVlore basically, what is required is prior planning for the negotiations.

Preparation for Negotiations.
The lack of an agreed position on prisoner repatriation and lack of preparalion for th()~(' 1H'p:olialion~. !loth al the
p()il\t~ of d"ri:;ion and at the len'l nl
\1 hi('h camp administration policy was
('~tablished. worked to the serious detri-
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llIellt of (lur 1J('~otiators throu;!hout tIll'
Korean armistice talks. Hoperull)' the
al'l'ointml'nt of Amhassador at Larl!,c
W. I\H~rd! Harriman to provide genera! supervision of all Department of
State aelions (:olll'ernin~ prisonC'J's held
hy hoth sides and the formation of a
Department of Defense Commillee Oil
Prisoner of War Policy chaired hy the
Assistant Serretary of Dcfem;e (International Se(:urity Allain,) will provide
the Goor<lillated hi;!h.levc! direelion
and emphasis that is required.:! The
construction of prisoner-of-war camps
with adequate php'ieal facilities and
the close coordination established with
the representatives of the ICRC in
South Vietnam should prevent some
of the difficulties which were apparent
in the Korean situation.
In plannin~ for negotiations we
must keep in mind how extremely important in Korea was the order in
which agenda items were addressed.
\Ve must insist on early selllell1ent of
prisoner-of-war repatriation if \ other
items are also heing 11egotiated. Our
nel!"otiators must make unequi\'o('ahly
dear to the other sielt' that the United
Statf's will not consider any agenda
item sell led until the repatriation of
prisoners of war has Iwen agreed upon.
If the COlllmunists are made to understand that whate\'er ohjecti\'e they
hoped to gain by entering into negotiations cannot be gained with early a~ree·
ment to release prisoners of war, we
can disabuse them of the notion that
by retaining prisoners of war they can,
as in Korea, exact concession after
concession from our side. Our Government olres it to our captured ]lersonnel to make their release an agenda
item of the highest priority.
Holding prisoners of war is of interest to tIl(' COJllmunists only as a
nl'gotiating le\'l'r on otht'r issut's. Earl~
rt'pat riat ion hy itst'lf is a ('OIJ('I'SSiOIl
they ran JIlake without damai!:e. \Ve
sha'uld not conclud'e, howe\,er, tlIat they

II ill rt'lt'ast' 0111' prisoners \I ithollt lIIakin;.\' liS pay for thl'lll. Korl'a indil'ates
ot\wrwisl'. \VI~ llIust hI' prepnrl'eI to
make I:OIII'I'Ssions in retllrn and not
eX[led that a 1111're exchange of 0111'
pl'isoncrs for theirs will rcsult ill fruitful ncgotiations. We must sellle the
prisoner-of-war issue while we still have
sOll1cthin~ to concede that, while not
vital to us, is of importance to thc
other sidt'o

Avoidjn~ Propa~m1(li7.in~.
As
was seell in the Korean analysis. the
propap;antla victol') the UNC anti tIll'
United States achieved may \I'e11 have
been a major contributing factor to
the lonp; delay in reaehing an armistice.
The lastinp; ellcct or benefit to the
United States of this propap;anda victory has heen negligible. To regain
our captiye personnel we should avoid
embarrassing the other side no matter
how tempting the opportunity may
sccm. I f repatria~ion in increments
hegins, we should not propagandize
about the condition of the personnel
returned or allow puhliratinn of n'turnees' aecounts of conditions within
the prisoner-of-war camps. To attempt
to disfigure at that time the image the
Communists have attempted to build
of humanity and generosity would not
be in th~ interest of early repatriation.

Coordination with the Repuhlic
of Vietnam. The faet that all prisoners of war in South Vietnam are in
the custody of ARVN could calise complications that must be anticipated. lL
is proper to assume that the regime in
Saigon, as was 'thc regime in Seoul,
will he against any cOllcessions to the
Communists that would either weaken
their position or infrin~e upon thpir
sovereignty. We should expect them
to be understandably suspect of any
hilateral United States-Communist
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ne~olialion~. They will bclie\'c that in
order to get back our prisoner~ of war,
somethin~ that bclonr:s to us, we will
bargain away- somethin~ that h~lon~s
to the Republic of Vietnam. We should,
of course, make every effort to estahlish fully mutual confidence and understanding and allempt to bring them to
our point of \'iC\\". Such thin1!~ a~ the
homhin1! of North Virtnam. a hloekadr
of North Vietnam (if ~ueh i~ l'~tah·
li~hrd prior to IIrr:nt iat ions I, anel re'po~itionin~ of American tro()P~ in
South Vietnam do helclIlp; to us, hnw(wer,- and can hI! c'IIIH'Plled if n('I'I'~~ary
without infrin~inl! upon thc 50Yerei~nt) of the HC'pllhlic' of Vietnam. We
c'annot nllow the ~lIlIth Vil,tmlll\(,~(' In
u~(' their c:u~tody of Amcric:an-capturrd
prisoner!; as a Icn>r against us, rcelucing our flexihility in negotiations with
the Communists.

Conclusion. On any occasion when
the Uni~ed Statc~ ner:otiates with the
Communists it su/Tcrs from one fundamental di~advantar:e: the United Siaies
mu~t consider indi\'idual ri~hts and human dignity. The Communists considcr only the power position resulting
from the outcome of the negotiations.
This funoamental disadvantage i~ parlieu larly se\'ere in prisonrr-o f-wa r
ncg<!tiations, wherc the 'ohject of thc
negotiations is the individual. The Communists in Vietnam have demonstrated
that they consider prisoners of war legitimate pawns of political warfare. They do
not vary from the Communists in Korea
in this consideration. The basic lesson
from Korea is clear: To the Communist
the prisoner of war is a hsstage. If you are
not prepared to liberate him by force,
you must be prepared to ransom him at
some political cost.
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